Hopes for
the Future of Islamic Finance
Dr. Abbas Mirakhor
Eminent Islamic Scholar and Executive Director
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
Introduction
I am grateful
to Allah SWT, to brother Muazzam Ali and to organizers of this Conference:
the Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance and the Islamic Development
Bank for the opportunity of being here tonight. I am especially
pleased to see our dear brother Muazzam Ali, the Dean of Islamic
banking and finance. I have the pleasure of knowing him since the
late 1970s. He indeed counts among the very early pioneers in this
field and has greatly contributed to the growth and development
of Islamic banking. We owe him an enormous debt of gratitude.
Past Successes
The topic of
my talk is challenges to and for Islamic finance: a look into the
past, present, and our hopes for the future. For someone like me,
it is astonishing to realize how far and fast Islamic finance has
come and how well it has managed to meet the challenges it faced
in just two decades. It is astonishing because when I started my
own research in this field in mid-1970s, there was virtually no
analytic works on Islamic banking and finance that could explain
in modern economic and financial analytic language what Islam expects
of a financial system in a modern economy. And, of course, virtually
no major Islamic banks existed at the time.
Based on what
was known then, and in the absence of an analytic framework recognizable
by modern economic and financial theory, most western observers
and commentators began to refer to Islamic banking and financial
system as a "zero-interest" system, by which they meant
"no return to capital". I recall when the Islamic Revolution
of Iran succeeded and its leaders and economists declared they wished
to eliminate Riba from their economic system, western media, including
the BBC and the Wall Street Journal, commented on the impossibility
of such a system referring to the thinking behind it as " voodoo
economics".
By 1983-84,
when Iran, Pakistan, and Sudan declared that they would adopt a
system-wide Islamic banking and finance, the challenge was to show
that such a system was first theoretically and analytically a viable
financial system; second, it had to be shown that such a system
was empirically workable as a whole and financially viable for each
of its parts, meaning Islamic banks and financial institutions.
The challenge
came from western analysts who suggested the folly of adopting such
a system. Here, I summarize their arguments in six propositions:
- that zero
interest meant infinite demand for loanable funds and zero supply;
- such a system
would be incapable of equilibrating demand for and supply of loanable
funds;
- with zero
interest rate there would be no savings;
- this meant
no investment and no growth;
- in this
system, there could be no monetary policy since no instruments
of liquidity management could exist without a fixed predetermined
rate of interest; and, finally,
- this all
meant that in countries adopting such a system there would be
one way capital flight.
By 1988, this
challenge was met when research, using modern analytic financial
and economic theory, showed that:
- A modern
financial system can be designed without the need for an ex ante
determined positive nominal fixed interest rate. [In fact, it
had been shown by western researchers that there was no satisfactory
theory that could explain the existence of a positive nominal
ex ante interest rate];
- Moreover,
it was shown that not assuming a nominal fixed ex ante positive
interest rate, i.e., no debt contract, did not necessarily mean
that there would have to be zero return to capital;
- The basic
proposition of Islamic finance was that the return to capital
would be determined ex post, and that the magnitude of return
to capital was determined on the basis of the return to the economic
activity in which the funds were employed;
- It was that
expected return which determined investment;
- It was also
the expected rate of return, and income, which determined savings.
Therefore, there is no justification for assuming that in such
a system there would be no savings and investment;
- It was shown
that in such a system there would be positive growth;
- That monetary
policy in such a system would function as in the conventional
system, its efficiency depending on the availability of instruments
which could be designed to manage liquidity;
- Finally,
it was shown that, in an open-economy macroeconomic model without
an ex ante fixed interest, but with returns to investment determined
ex post, there was no justification to assume that there would
be a one-way capital flight.
Therefore, the
system which prohibited a fixed ex ante interest rate and allowed
the rate of return to capital to be determined ex post, based on
the returns to the economic activity in which the funds were employed,
was theoretically viable.
In the process
of demonstrating the analytic viability of such a system, research
also clearly differentiated it from the conventional system. In
the conventional system, based on debt contracts, risks and rewards
were shared asymmetrically with the debtor carrying the greatest
part of the risk, and with governments enforcing the contract. Such
a system had a built-in incentive structure that promoted moral
hazard and asymmetric information requiring close monitoring whose
costs could be managed if monitoring could be delegated to an institution
which could act on behalf of the collectivity of depositor/investor;
hence the reason for existence of banking institutions.
In the late
1970s - early 1980s, it was shown, mostly by Minsky, that such a
system was inherently prone to instability because there would always
be maturity mismatch between liabilities (short-term deposits) and
assets (investment-long-term). Because the nominal values of liabilities
were guaranteed, but not the nominal value of assets, when the maturity
mismatch became a problem, the banks would go into a liability management
mode by offering higher interest rates to attract more deposits.
There was always the possibility that this process could not be
sustained resulting in erosion in confidence and bank runs. Such
a system, therefore, needed a lender of last resort and bankruptcy
procedures, restructuring processes, and debt workout procedures
to mitigate contagion.
During 1950s
- 60s, Lloyd Metzler of the University of Chicago had proposed an
alternative system in which contracts were based on equity rather
than debt, and in which there was no guarantee of nominal values
of liability since these were tied to the nominal values of assets.
Metzler showed that such a system did not have the instability characteristics
of the conventional banking system. In 1985, in his now classic
article in the IMF staff papers, Mohsin Khan, showed the affinity
of Metzler's model to Islamic finance. Using Metzler's basic model,
Mohsin Khan demonstrated that this system produces a saddle point
and is, therefore, more stable than the conventional system.
By early 1990s,
it was clear that an Islamic financial system was not only theoretically
viable, but had desirable characteristics that rendered it superior
to a debt-based conventional system. The phenomenon growth of Islamic
finance during the decade of 1990s, demonstrated the empirical and
practical viability of the system.
Hopes for
the future
The crises we
have been witnessing in the international financial system since
1997 have set the stage for Islamic finance to demonstrate its viability
as potentially a genuine alternative global financial system. The
present international system is deficient in many ways of which
the two most important are:
- A debt-based
system needs an effective lender of last resort, and the present
international financial system does not have one and it is not
likely that one will emerge anytime soon; and
- A debt-based
system needs bankruptcy proceedings, debt restructuring, and workout
mechanisms and processes which the present international financial
system lacks. There are preliminary discussions underway for an
international sovereign debt restructuring mechanism to be established,
but there are many complications. While such a mechanism, if and
when it comes into being, will help reduce the risk of moral hazard
and lead to better distribution of risk, it will not address the
inherent fundamental fragility of a system largely based on debt
contracts.
In the mean
time, there are no guarantees that the international financial system
has witnessed its last crises with their huge domestic costs that,
at times, have threatened the very foundation and fabric of societies.
The example of Indonesia is a heartbreaker; it took this country
25 years to reduce poverty by 50 percent, but it took a year of
severe financial crisis to wipe out most of this gain. Countries
with an otherwise viable economic system have paid dearly for crises
generated by a debt structure whose nominal values and maturities
were out of line, with the ability of the economic structure to
service them.
There are many
analyses of financial crises and a long list of their causes, but
surprisingly little is said about the one underlying common denominator
to all of them: debt contracts that are by nature out of sync, and
unrelated to, the income flows that the underlying productive and
capital assets of these countries can generate to serve them. The
jury is still out as to the reasons why Malaysia did not suffer
from contagion as much as other crises countries. While capital
controls may have played a role, some analysts believe its liability
structure and its general reliance on non-debt-creating flows made
Malaysia less vulnerable to crisis.
While the financial
innovations of the 1990s in the conventional system have led to
mobilization of financial resources in astronomical proportions,
they have also led to the equally impressive growth of debt contracts
and instruments. According to the latest reports, there are now
US$32 trillion of sovereign and corporate bonds alone. Compare this
(plus all other forms of debt, including consumer debt in industrial
countries) to the production and capital base of the global economy
and one observes an inverted pyramid of huge debt piled up on a
narrow production base that is supposed to generate the income flows
that are to serve this debt. In short, this growth in debt has nearly
severed the relationship between finance and production. Analysts
are now worried about a "debt bubble". For each dollar
worth of production there are thousands of dollars of debt claims.
An Islamic financial system has the potential to redress this serious
threat to global financial stability because of its fundamental
operating principle of a close link between financial and productive
flows and because of its requirement of risk sharing.
It is now a
serious advice of the IMF to developing countries that they should:
- Avoid debt-creating
flows;
- Rely mostly
on FDI;
- If they have
to borrow, they should ensure that their debt obligations are
not bunched toward the short end of maturities;
- If they have
to borrow, they should ensure that their economy is producing
enough primary surplus to meet their debt obligations;
- Ensure that
their sovereign bonds incorporate clauses (majority action clause,
engagement clause, initiation clause) that make debt workout and
restructuring easier. That is, to make sure that there exists
better risk sharing mechanisms to avoid moral hazard; and finally,
- They should
put in place an efficient debt management structure.
In these circumstances,
Islamic finance can provide a viable financial system on a global
scale, but there are challenges that have to be met to make it so.
Islamic finance has to adopt the best standards of accountability,
transparency and efficiency. Fortunately, an architecture of Islamic
finance on a global scale is emerging with the establishment of
supporting institutions such as:
- The Accounting
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions through
the efforts of Professor Rifaat Abdel Karim
- The International
Islamic Rating Agency
- The Islamic
Financial Services Board
- The International
Islamic Financial Market, and
- The Liquidity
Management Center
As this architecture
emerges, Islamic finance has to develop its own genuinely Islamic
financial instruments. So far, we have been free riding on financial
theories and instruments developed within the context of the conventional
debt and interest-based system. Unless Islamic finance develops
its own genuinely Islamic financial instruments, it cannot achieve
the dynamism of a system that provides security, liquidity, and
diversity needed for a globally accepted financial system which
would be a genuine alternative to the present debt-interest-based
international financial system.
Unfortunately,
there are, at the present, nothing in the Muslim world close to
resembling large endowment institutions, such as the National Science
Foundation, the Ford Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and
the like to support research in Islamic banking, finance and economics.
There is, therefore, an urgent need for scholarly foundations, institutions,
colleges, and universities that can train Islamic financial engineers
who are well trained in economic and financial theory and methods,
on the one hand, and Islamic Shariah, on the other. My generation
was fortunate to have people like Dr. Anas Azzarqa and Dr. Kazem
Sadr who are equally at ease with Islamic "Fiqh" as with
economic theory and method. Trained by their fathers (Sheikh Mustafa
Azzarqa and Ayatullah Reza Sadr, ???? ???? ??????) in "Fiqh"
and having earned doctorate degrees in economics from reputable
universities in the U.S.A., they were able to help the rest of us
in understanding the intricacies of Islamic "Fiqh" as
it related to finance. There is now a need to systematize the process
of training financial engineers, experts in modern finance who are
well versed in the Shariah, to expand the horizon and the menu of
available Islamic financial instruments.
Islamic finance
possesses the basic instruments that can be spanned into a wide,
varied, and variegated menu of financial instruments. There is a
theory developed in the 1980s referred to as the spanning theory
which asserts that if there is one basic financial instrument it
can be spanned into an infinite number of instruments. Islamic finance
has at least 14 basic instruments and financial experts can span
these into a much larger menu to provide greater security, liquidity,
and diversity to meet the demand of investors on a global scale.
Let me say once again that there is an urgent need for rich endowments
to be established solely for the purpose of financially supporting
institutions that can train the kind of research scholars and experts
mentioned.
Let me conclude
by mentioning a very important function of Islamic finance that
is seldom noted: that is the ability of Islamic finance to provide
the vehicle for financial and economic empowerment. Before I do
so, let me recommend the works of the Peruvian economist Hernando
de Soto. De Soto's long-time research has been summarized in a recent
book titled: "The Mystery of Capital". His basic thesis
is that much of the poor in developing countries are in possession
of what he calls dead capital. He estimates that the developing
and former communist countries possess US$9.3 trillion worth of
dead capital. These are physical resources and capital that are
not used for any purpose other than to provide physical service
to their owners. He suggests that the ability of documenting and
using this capital as a productive asset is what distinguishes the
rich from the poor. How can Islamic finance help to empower financially
those who are in possession of dead capital? Let me give some rudimentary
examples:
Agricultural
Development Bank of Iran through Mazarah partnerships with farmers
helps them to convert their physical possession into assets that
can generate additional capital. Also through the Islamic law of
Arz Amwat Aiya of dead capital is converted into productive asset.
A second example is that of the Housing Bank of Iran which through
Musharakah and lease purchase agreements helps people without homes
to own one. These
homes can then
be used to generate additional capital for the owners to undertake
other productive activities. Similarly, Islamic finance can be used
in other Muslim and developing countries to convert dead capital
into income generating assets to financially and economically empower
the poor.